Robin Wright Penn files for divorce
(AP) - 23 hours ago
SAN FRANCISCO — Robin Wright and her husband, Sean Penn, are calling it quits on their more than decade-long marriage.
People magazine reports that Wright filed for divorce from Penn Aug. 12 in Marin County, Calif.
The magazine says Wright and Penn, who have had a tumultuous relationship, have agreed to share custody of their 16-year-old son, Hopper Jack. Court papers cite "irreconcilable differences" for the split.
A representative for Wright did not return an e-mail seeking comment.
The couple married in April 1996. The Penns have twice before filed for divorce or separation only to dismiss their petition a short time later.
Sean Penn won an Oscar for his role in "Milk" at the Academy Awards in February but did not thank his wife in his acceptance speech.Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer
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Chatham County GA Divorce Lawyer - JOHNSON v. TAYLOR
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2008-GA-A0630.009
JOHNSON v. TAYLOR
JOHNSON
v.
TAYLOR.
A08A0614.
Court of Appeals of Georgia
June 27, 2008
SMITH, Presiding Judge.
Kurtis Taylor petitioned to adopt his stepson, R.C.J., and to terminate the parental rights of Frederick Johnson, R.C.J.'s biological father, pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-8-6 and 19-8-10. Johnson objected and sought to maintain his parental rights in his son. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Taylor's petition and entered a final decree of adoption. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights based on an adoption petition, we construe the evidence favorably to the trial court's ruling and determine "whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the biological parent's rights to custody have been lost." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sellers v. Sellers, 277 Ga. App. 814 (627 SE2d 882) (2006). We do not weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility, but defer to the trial court's factual findings and affirm unless this standard is not met. Davis v. Rathel, 273 Ga. App. 183 (614 SE2d 823) (2005).
So viewed, the evidence shows that R.C.J. was born on December 19, 1997, and his parents divorced in May 2000. Pursuant to the divorce settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree, the mother retained physical custody of R.C.J., she and Johnson had joint legal custody, and Johnson was entitled to weekly supervised visitation. The supervised visitation was to continue until Johnson passed six months of drug screens, after which his visitation rights would increase. The agreement further required Johnson to pay the mother $500 per month in child support and share in R.C.J.'s medical and dental expenses.
The mother married Taylor in September 2001, when R.C.J. was three years old. At the hearing, the mother described R.C.J.'s relationship with Taylor as "very close," noting that R.C.J. has never referred to anyone but Taylor as "Dad" and that Taylor is fully involved in her son's day-to-day life, education, and activities. According to the mother, Taylor "[has] been there for every milestone and everything major, 100 percent." The mother further testified that Taylor is "the only father [R.C.J. has] ever known."
In contrast, the mother testified that Johnson has not been involved in her son's life. When the mother first informed Johnson of the pregnancy, he expressed no excitement or interest and indicated that he could not support a child. Their marriage at that point was "on very, very shaky ground," and they separated several months later. During the pregnancy, Johnson provided no financial or other support to the mother, and he spent only one hour with his newborn son on the night of R.C.J.'s birth, then went to a nightclub. Thereafter, he had little interaction with the baby, although R.C.J.'s paternal grandmother sometimes spent time with the child during the day while the mother was at work. The mother eventually discovered that Johnson was involved with drugs, and she filed for divorce.
According to the mother, Johnson never exercised any facet of his joint legal custody over R.C.J., and he did not take the drug tests necessary to obtain unsupervised visitation. Although Johnson paid the mother some child support in the first year after the divorce, he made all payments grudgingly and never met his full monthly support obligation. The mother further testified that Johnson has not helped with R.C.J.'s medical and dental expenses, despite the requirement in the parties' divorce settlement agreement.
At some point in 2000, Johnson moved to Miami, where he lived until January 2002. During that period, the mother received child support payments, but Johnson never paid the full monthly amount or caught up on his support arrearage. Moreover, much of the money arriving from Florida actually came from Johnson's girlfriend, who testified that she sent the mother money because Johnson, who was not working, had none, and she knew the mother needed help.
While Johnson lived in Miami, he did not send R.C.J. any cards, gifts, or letters. On one occasion, the mother traveled with R.C.J. to Florida to see Johnson, but Johnson appeared for the visit several hours late and was drunk. Johnson's family took R.C.J. to Florida for two additional visits, and Johnson testified that he saw R.C.J. at the grandmother's house "a few times" when he was in Georgia. Although Johnson claimed that the mother prevented other visits, the mother testified that she encouraged his participation in R.C.J.'s life at that point.
Johnson's Florida residency ended in early 2002, when he began a five-year federal prison sentence for selling drugs. The mother testified that while incarcerated, Johnson did not write R.C.J., send him any cards, or provide any monetary support for the child. Johnson called the mother occasionally from prison and sometimes inquired about R.C.J., but never asked to speak to his son. It appears, however, that he spoke with R.C.J. several times by telephone when R.C.J. was visiting his paternal grandmother. Johnson also offered evidence that he wrote R.C.J. one letter in 2003, which he sent to the grandmother's house.
The mother admitted that the paternal grandmother sent her several checks for child support in late 2006 and 2007, after the grandmother learned that Taylor planned to petition for adoption, but none were for the full support amount. Prior to those checks, she last received child support from Johnson or his family in January 2002. At the hearing, Johnson did not dispute that he was $36,000 in arrears on his support obligation.
In February 2007, shortly after Johnson's release from prison, Taylor petitioned to adopt R.C.J. pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (1), which governs step-parent adoptions. Generally, the biological parent whose rights will end with the adoption must "voluntarily and in writing surrender[] all of his rights to the child to [the step-parent] for the purpose of enabling [the step-parent] to adopt the child." OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (1). A voluntary surrender, however, is not always necessary. The step-parent's adoption petition may be granted without the biological parent's consent
if that parent, for a period of one year or longer immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, without justifiable cause, has significantly failed:
(1) To communicate or to make a bona fide attempt to communicate with [the] child in a meaningful, supportive, parental manner; or
(2) To provide for the care and support of [the] child as required by law or judicial decree,
and the court is of the opinion that the adoption is for the best interests of [the] child.
OCGA § 19-8-10 (b).
After hearing extensive evidence, the trial court found that (1) Johnson significantly failed for over one year, without justifiable cause, to communicate or attempt to communicate with R.C.J.; (2) he significantly failed to support the child financially; and (3) adoption by Taylor would be in R.C.J.'s best interest. The court granted Taylor's petition, despite Johnson's refusal to voluntarily surrender his parental rights. We find no error.
1. At the time of the hearing, Johnson had not seen his son in over five years. While incarcerated between 2002 and 2007, he wrote R.C.J. only one letter, which he mailed to the grandmother's house in August 2003, more than three years before the adoption petition was filed. He sent no other cards, letters, or mementos. During this same period, Johnson never asked to speak with his son when he called the mother's house, although he apparently talked with R.C.J. several times by telephone when the child was visiting the grandmother.
On appeal, Johnson argues that the mother "stonewall[ed]" his efforts to keep in touch with his son from prison. The mother, however, directly refuted this claim, asserting that she always accepted his collect calls from prison, that he never sought to speak with R.C.J., and that prior to his incarceration she tried to keep him involved in R.C.J.'s life. Although Johnson offered competing evidence, "[i]t was for the trial court, and not for the appellate court, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and resolve contested factual issues." (Citations omitted.) Davis, supra, 273 Ga. App. at 186.
At best, the record demonstrates infrequent and minimal efforts by Johnson to communicate with his son in a meaningful, supportive, and parental manner throughout the five years immediately preceding the adoption litigation. We recognize that Johnson was in federal prison during this period, and incarceration is often relevant in assessing "justifiable cause" for a failure to support or communicate with a child. Ray v. Denton, 278 Ga. App. 69, 71 (1) 628 SE2d 180) (2006). The trial court, however, "is vested with significant discretion in making the determination as to whether the parent's inaction is excusable." (Citation omitted.) Bateman v. Futch, 232 Ga. App. 271, 273 (1) (501 SE2d 615) (1998). Moreover, incarceration does not establish justification per se; "[e]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances." (Punctuation omitted.) Ray, supra, 278 Ga. App. at 71.
Johnson could have written R.C.J., sent him cards, or telephoned him regularly while in prison, but he did not do so. The record further shows that even before his imprisonment in 2002, Johnson's contact and visits with R.C.J. were sporadic. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to find a lack of significant communication under OCGA § 19-8-10 (b) (2).(fn1) See Bateman, supra, 232 Ga. App. at 273-274 (1); In re J.S.J., 180 Ga. App. 873, 875 (3) (350 SE2d 843) (1986) ("[W]ith regard to support and communication, `sporadic and de minimis' efforts do not require the court to find that there have been significant steps. [Cits.]").
2. Given our decision in Division 1, we need not address whether Johnson significantly failed, without justifiable cause, to support R.C.J. for more than one year. See Sellers, supra, 277 Ga. App. at 816 (because the requirements of OCGA § 19-18-10 (b) (1) and (b) (2) are alternative, we may affirm based on the evidence supporting a finding under one subsection, even if the trial court made findings under both).
3. Finally, the trial court did not err in concluding that adoption by Taylor would be in R.C.J.'s best interest. The superior court has broad discretion in matters of adoption, and its judgment will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Bateman, supra, 232 Ga. App. at 274 (2). "If there is any evidence to support the trial court's finding that the adoption is in the child's best interest, such finding will be affirmed." Id.
The evidence shows that R.C.J. views Taylor as his "Dad," and Taylor has been a father figure for the boy since 2001. In this role, Taylor has been intimately involved in R.C.J.'s daily life, participating in his activities, teaching him skills, and generally functioning as a loving, concerned parent. Taylor also testified that he is financially able to take care of R.C.J., and the evidence shows that he has supported the boy for years.
In contrast, Johnson has had very limited contact with R.C.J., provided virtually no financial or parental support during his five-year incarceration, and has generally expressed little interest in supporting or parenting the boy himself. We recognize that R.C.J. has spent time with his paternal grandmother, who clearly wants to remain part of his life. But the mother testified that her son does not have a close relationship with his grandmother, and given the evidence presented, we cannot find that the trial court abused its broad discretion in finding the adoption to be in R.C.J.'s best interest. See Ray, supra, 278 Ga. App. at 72; McCurry v. Harding, 270 Ga. App. 416, 420 (4) (606 SE2d 639) (2004).
Judgment affirmed.
Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur.
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2008-GA-A0630.009
JOHNSON v. TAYLOR
JOHNSON
v.
TAYLOR.
A08A0614.
Court of Appeals of Georgia
June 27, 2008
SMITH, Presiding Judge.
Kurtis Taylor petitioned to adopt his stepson, R.C.J., and to terminate the parental rights of Frederick Johnson, R.C.J.'s biological father, pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-8-6 and 19-8-10. Johnson objected and sought to maintain his parental rights in his son. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Taylor's petition and entered a final decree of adoption. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights based on an adoption petition, we construe the evidence favorably to the trial court's ruling and determine "whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the biological parent's rights to custody have been lost." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sellers v. Sellers, 277 Ga. App. 814 (627 SE2d 882) (2006). We do not weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility, but defer to the trial court's factual findings and affirm unless this standard is not met. Davis v. Rathel, 273 Ga. App. 183 (614 SE2d 823) (2005).
So viewed, the evidence shows that R.C.J. was born on December 19, 1997, and his parents divorced in May 2000. Pursuant to the divorce settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree, the mother retained physical custody of R.C.J., she and Johnson had joint legal custody, and Johnson was entitled to weekly supervised visitation. The supervised visitation was to continue until Johnson passed six months of drug screens, after which his visitation rights would increase. The agreement further required Johnson to pay the mother $500 per month in child support and share in R.C.J.'s medical and dental expenses.
The mother married Taylor in September 2001, when R.C.J. was three years old. At the hearing, the mother described R.C.J.'s relationship with Taylor as "very close," noting that R.C.J. has never referred to anyone but Taylor as "Dad" and that Taylor is fully involved in her son's day-to-day life, education, and activities. According to the mother, Taylor "[has] been there for every milestone and everything major, 100 percent." The mother further testified that Taylor is "the only father [R.C.J. has] ever known."
In contrast, the mother testified that Johnson has not been involved in her son's life. When the mother first informed Johnson of the pregnancy, he expressed no excitement or interest and indicated that he could not support a child. Their marriage at that point was "on very, very shaky ground," and they separated several months later. During the pregnancy, Johnson provided no financial or other support to the mother, and he spent only one hour with his newborn son on the night of R.C.J.'s birth, then went to a nightclub. Thereafter, he had little interaction with the baby, although R.C.J.'s paternal grandmother sometimes spent time with the child during the day while the mother was at work. The mother eventually discovered that Johnson was involved with drugs, and she filed for divorce.
According to the mother, Johnson never exercised any facet of his joint legal custody over R.C.J., and he did not take the drug tests necessary to obtain unsupervised visitation. Although Johnson paid the mother some child support in the first year after the divorce, he made all payments grudgingly and never met his full monthly support obligation. The mother further testified that Johnson has not helped with R.C.J.'s medical and dental expenses, despite the requirement in the parties' divorce settlement agreement.
At some point in 2000, Johnson moved to Miami, where he lived until January 2002. During that period, the mother received child support payments, but Johnson never paid the full monthly amount or caught up on his support arrearage. Moreover, much of the money arriving from Florida actually came from Johnson's girlfriend, who testified that she sent the mother money because Johnson, who was not working, had none, and she knew the mother needed help.
While Johnson lived in Miami, he did not send R.C.J. any cards, gifts, or letters. On one occasion, the mother traveled with R.C.J. to Florida to see Johnson, but Johnson appeared for the visit several hours late and was drunk. Johnson's family took R.C.J. to Florida for two additional visits, and Johnson testified that he saw R.C.J. at the grandmother's house "a few times" when he was in Georgia. Although Johnson claimed that the mother prevented other visits, the mother testified that she encouraged his participation in R.C.J.'s life at that point.
Johnson's Florida residency ended in early 2002, when he began a five-year federal prison sentence for selling drugs. The mother testified that while incarcerated, Johnson did not write R.C.J., send him any cards, or provide any monetary support for the child. Johnson called the mother occasionally from prison and sometimes inquired about R.C.J., but never asked to speak to his son. It appears, however, that he spoke with R.C.J. several times by telephone when R.C.J. was visiting his paternal grandmother. Johnson also offered evidence that he wrote R.C.J. one letter in 2003, which he sent to the grandmother's house.
The mother admitted that the paternal grandmother sent her several checks for child support in late 2006 and 2007, after the grandmother learned that Taylor planned to petition for adoption, but none were for the full support amount. Prior to those checks, she last received child support from Johnson or his family in January 2002. At the hearing, Johnson did not dispute that he was $36,000 in arrears on his support obligation.
In February 2007, shortly after Johnson's release from prison, Taylor petitioned to adopt R.C.J. pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (1), which governs step-parent adoptions. Generally, the biological parent whose rights will end with the adoption must "voluntarily and in writing surrender[] all of his rights to the child to [the step-parent] for the purpose of enabling [the step-parent] to adopt the child." OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (1). A voluntary surrender, however, is not always necessary. The step-parent's adoption petition may be granted without the biological parent's consent
if that parent, for a period of one year or longer immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, without justifiable cause, has significantly failed:
(1) To communicate or to make a bona fide attempt to communicate with [the] child in a meaningful, supportive, parental manner; or
(2) To provide for the care and support of [the] child as required by law or judicial decree,
and the court is of the opinion that the adoption is for the best interests of [the] child.
OCGA § 19-8-10 (b).
After hearing extensive evidence, the trial court found that (1) Johnson significantly failed for over one year, without justifiable cause, to communicate or attempt to communicate with R.C.J.; (2) he significantly failed to support the child financially; and (3) adoption by Taylor would be in R.C.J.'s best interest. The court granted Taylor's petition, despite Johnson's refusal to voluntarily surrender his parental rights. We find no error.
1. At the time of the hearing, Johnson had not seen his son in over five years. While incarcerated between 2002 and 2007, he wrote R.C.J. only one letter, which he mailed to the grandmother's house in August 2003, more than three years before the adoption petition was filed. He sent no other cards, letters, or mementos. During this same period, Johnson never asked to speak with his son when he called the mother's house, although he apparently talked with R.C.J. several times by telephone when the child was visiting the grandmother.
On appeal, Johnson argues that the mother "stonewall[ed]" his efforts to keep in touch with his son from prison. The mother, however, directly refuted this claim, asserting that she always accepted his collect calls from prison, that he never sought to speak with R.C.J., and that prior to his incarceration she tried to keep him involved in R.C.J.'s life. Although Johnson offered competing evidence, "[i]t was for the trial court, and not for the appellate court, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and resolve contested factual issues." (Citations omitted.) Davis, supra, 273 Ga. App. at 186.
At best, the record demonstrates infrequent and minimal efforts by Johnson to communicate with his son in a meaningful, supportive, and parental manner throughout the five years immediately preceding the adoption litigation. We recognize that Johnson was in federal prison during this period, and incarceration is often relevant in assessing "justifiable cause" for a failure to support or communicate with a child. Ray v. Denton, 278 Ga. App. 69, 71 (1) 628 SE2d 180) (2006). The trial court, however, "is vested with significant discretion in making the determination as to whether the parent's inaction is excusable." (Citation omitted.) Bateman v. Futch, 232 Ga. App. 271, 273 (1) (501 SE2d 615) (1998). Moreover, incarceration does not establish justification per se; "[e]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances." (Punctuation omitted.) Ray, supra, 278 Ga. App. at 71.
Johnson could have written R.C.J., sent him cards, or telephoned him regularly while in prison, but he did not do so. The record further shows that even before his imprisonment in 2002, Johnson's contact and visits with R.C.J. were sporadic. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to find a lack of significant communication under OCGA § 19-8-10 (b) (2).(fn1) See Bateman, supra, 232 Ga. App. at 273-274 (1); In re J.S.J., 180 Ga. App. 873, 875 (3) (350 SE2d 843) (1986) ("[W]ith regard to support and communication, `sporadic and de minimis' efforts do not require the court to find that there have been significant steps. [Cits.]").
2. Given our decision in Division 1, we need not address whether Johnson significantly failed, without justifiable cause, to support R.C.J. for more than one year. See Sellers, supra, 277 Ga. App. at 816 (because the requirements of OCGA § 19-18-10 (b) (1) and (b) (2) are alternative, we may affirm based on the evidence supporting a finding under one subsection, even if the trial court made findings under both).
3. Finally, the trial court did not err in concluding that adoption by Taylor would be in R.C.J.'s best interest. The superior court has broad discretion in matters of adoption, and its judgment will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Bateman, supra, 232 Ga. App. at 274 (2). "If there is any evidence to support the trial court's finding that the adoption is in the child's best interest, such finding will be affirmed." Id.
The evidence shows that R.C.J. views Taylor as his "Dad," and Taylor has been a father figure for the boy since 2001. In this role, Taylor has been intimately involved in R.C.J.'s daily life, participating in his activities, teaching him skills, and generally functioning as a loving, concerned parent. Taylor also testified that he is financially able to take care of R.C.J., and the evidence shows that he has supported the boy for years.
In contrast, Johnson has had very limited contact with R.C.J., provided virtually no financial or parental support during his five-year incarceration, and has generally expressed little interest in supporting or parenting the boy himself. We recognize that R.C.J. has spent time with his paternal grandmother, who clearly wants to remain part of his life. But the mother testified that her son does not have a close relationship with his grandmother, and given the evidence presented, we cannot find that the trial court abused its broad discretion in finding the adoption to be in R.C.J.'s best interest. See Ray, supra, 278 Ga. App. at 72; McCurry v. Harding, 270 Ga. App. 416, 420 (4) (606 SE2d 639) (2004).
Judgment affirmed.
Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur.
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Chatham County GA Divorce Lawyer - Savannah Divorce - BUBRICK v. THE STATE
Chatham County GA Divorce Lawyer - Savannah Divorce
BUBRICK
v.
THE STATE.
A08A0873.
Court of Appeals of Georgia
September 9, 2008
PHIPPS, Judge.
Chad Michael Bubrick was convicted of committing burglary, with the intent to commit arson, at the home of his ex-wife;(fn1) aggravated stalking of her;(fn2) obstructing two law enforcement officers;(fn3) and hindering a third law enforcement officer.(fn4) On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his burglary conviction, that his character was impermissibly injected in evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Because Bubrick has shown no reversible error, we affirm.
The state's evidence showed the following.(fn5) On November 22, 2005, Bubrick went into his ex-wife's house without her consent. She called 911, and he left. Bubrick telephoned his ex-wife while the responding police officer was at the scene. The officer advised Bubrick that his ex-wife did not want him there and that, if he returned, he would be arrested for criminal trespass.
A few nights later, on November 24, 2005, Bubrick's ex-wife saw Bubrick in her backyard and went outside to demand that he leave. When he refused, she went inside and called 911. He followed her. Bubrick's ex-wife complained to the responding law enforcement officer that Bubrick was there in violation of a restraining order she had obtained against him. The officer asked Bubrick to place his hands against a wall, but Bubrick replied that he was not going to jail. When the officer grabbed Bubrick's hands, he wrangled free of the officer's grasp, pushed the officer away from him, maneuvered into a fighting stance, and retorted to the officer's warning of being shot by a Taser gun with, "Shoot me." After being so shot, Bubrick ran from the scene.
Within hours, at about 2:00 a.m. on November 25, Bubrick's ex-wife again called 911 because of the sound of a basement window breaking. Two uniformed police officers arrived within five minutes to find Bubrick lying face-down in a basement room between a bed and a wall with a window. Bubrick ignored the officers' several commands to put his hands behind his back. After he stood, his ex-wife saw that he was holding a container of charcoal lighter fluid and several lighters. Bubrick refused to comply with police commands to lie across the bed with his hands outstretched. He yelled repeatedly that he was not going to jail and then charged toward one of the officers. The other officer shot Bubrick with a Taser gun. Bubrick tried to flee, but was caught by one of the officers. Bubrick screamed that he was not going to jail and struggled to free himself from the officer, despite the officer's orders for him to cease fighting. The other officer assisted in the physical struggle to gain control of Bubrick, and although Bubrick was pepper-sprayed and again shot by a Taser gun, he continued to struggle with the officers against their restraint. Bubrick disregarded the officers' commands to cease fighting and lie on the floor, and he continued to yell that he was not going to jail. The officers eventually subdued Bubrick to the extent that he could be handcuffed by a third uniformed law enforcement officer who had arrived as backup. Placed in a patrol car backseat, Bubrick continued to kick the vehicle's doors and windows, notwithstanding police commands to cease doing so.
During the scuffle with Bubrick, the officers discovered in Bubrick's jacket pocket a screwdriver and a container of charcoal lighter fluid. After the scuffle, a second container of charcoal lighter fluid was found on the bedroom floor where Bubrick initially had been discovered. On the night in question, Bubrick's ex-wife did not own any charcoal lighter fluid and did not store lighters in that part of the house.
1. Bubrick challenges his burglary conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to commit arson inside his ex-wife's residence.
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is set out in Jackson v. Virginia.(fn6) The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. An appellate court determines only the legal sufficiency of the evidence adduced below and does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.(fn7)
Bubrick misplaces reliance upon State v. Bryant.(fn8) In that case, the state contested the grant of the defendant's motion for directed verdict on a burglary charge.(fn9) We did not consider the merits of the state's evidentiary challenge, but dismissed the appeal, explaining, "The government cannot appeal such a directed verdict of acquittal, even if it is erroneously granted."(fn10) Here, no grant of a motion for directed verdict is being contested by the state. And the evidence showed that Bubrick broke into his ex-wife's residence at about 2:00 a.m., bringing with him containers of flammable liquid and several lighters. Although, as Bubrick points out, no fire was started, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bubrick intended to commit therein the felony of arson.(fn11)
2. Bubrick's contention that the state improperly injected his character in evidence was waived by his trial lawyer's failure to object.(fn12)
3. Bubrick contends that his trial lawyer's failure to object to improper character evidence amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Bubrick complains that two of the state's witnesses - a law enforcement officer and Bubrick's ex-wife - made references before the jury that he had been in jail.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must establish, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington,(fn13) that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. . . . In reviewing a trial court's determination regarding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court upholds the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous; we review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo.(fn14)
We need not address both components of the Strickland test if the showing on one is insufficient; nor must we address the components in any particular order.(fn15)
(a) While the first two officers who responded to the 2:00 a.m. emergency call testified that Bubrick adamantly proclaimed throughout their encounter that he was not going to jail, the third officer who later arrived as backup twice testified that he heard Bubrick scream, "I'm not going back to jail." "Evidence which is relevant to an issue in a case is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it incidentally puts the defendant's character at issue."(fn16) Here, the words Bubrick repeatedly screamed as he refused to comply with the officers' commands and resisted restraint by them demonstrated his intent to commit the counts of obstruction and hindering underlying this case. Evidence of Bubrick's utterances, therefore, was not rendered inadmissible merely because it incidentally put his character at issue,(fn17) and his trial lawyer's performance was not deficient for not objecting to this officer's recollection of what Bubrick said at the crime scene.(fn18)
(b) Bubrick's ex-wife was asked by the prosecutor about her and Bubrick's living arrangements after their divorce. She answered that she moved to her parents' home, while Bubrick remained at the apartment they had shared when married. She continued, "And when he was arrested, of course, he didn't have any place. When he got out he was [at a different residence]." On cross-examination, Bubrick's ex-wife was asked whether Bubrick had visited her residence after their divorce. She answered that, aside from those occasions in which Bubrick would just "show up" and she would call the police, he came to her residence every other weekend to pick up their child for scheduled visitation. She continued, "After he got out the judge say just visitations every Saturday [at] a public place, McDonald's or where she can play, and just for two hours." On re-direct, Bubrick's ex-wife was asked, "What does McDonald's have to do with the child and visitation?" She answered, ". . . he went to jail, so he got out and just [had] supervised visitations." Pretermitting whether trial counsel committed professional error by failing to object to the challenged testimony, having examined the entirety of the trial transcript, we find no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to object to the cited references, the outcome of Bubrick's trial would have been different.(fn19)
Judgment affirmed.
Barnes, C.J., and Johnson, P.J., concur.
Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer
GA Uncontested Divorce - Georgia Contested Divorce -
We specialize in: Georgia Separation Agreements - Spousal Support - Property Division - Alimony - Military Divorce - Contempt Actions in Divorce Cases, Uncontested Divorce, Savannah Georgia Noncontested divorce - Child Custody Attorney / Custody modification - Child Support Modification - Child Visitation
Savannah GA, Richmond Hill, GA, Fort Stewart, Hinesville, Georgia Family Law Lawyer
BUBRICK
v.
THE STATE.
A08A0873.
Court of Appeals of Georgia
September 9, 2008
PHIPPS, Judge.
Chad Michael Bubrick was convicted of committing burglary, with the intent to commit arson, at the home of his ex-wife;(fn1) aggravated stalking of her;(fn2) obstructing two law enforcement officers;(fn3) and hindering a third law enforcement officer.(fn4) On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his burglary conviction, that his character was impermissibly injected in evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Because Bubrick has shown no reversible error, we affirm.
The state's evidence showed the following.(fn5) On November 22, 2005, Bubrick went into his ex-wife's house without her consent. She called 911, and he left. Bubrick telephoned his ex-wife while the responding police officer was at the scene. The officer advised Bubrick that his ex-wife did not want him there and that, if he returned, he would be arrested for criminal trespass.
A few nights later, on November 24, 2005, Bubrick's ex-wife saw Bubrick in her backyard and went outside to demand that he leave. When he refused, she went inside and called 911. He followed her. Bubrick's ex-wife complained to the responding law enforcement officer that Bubrick was there in violation of a restraining order she had obtained against him. The officer asked Bubrick to place his hands against a wall, but Bubrick replied that he was not going to jail. When the officer grabbed Bubrick's hands, he wrangled free of the officer's grasp, pushed the officer away from him, maneuvered into a fighting stance, and retorted to the officer's warning of being shot by a Taser gun with, "Shoot me." After being so shot, Bubrick ran from the scene.
Within hours, at about 2:00 a.m. on November 25, Bubrick's ex-wife again called 911 because of the sound of a basement window breaking. Two uniformed police officers arrived within five minutes to find Bubrick lying face-down in a basement room between a bed and a wall with a window. Bubrick ignored the officers' several commands to put his hands behind his back. After he stood, his ex-wife saw that he was holding a container of charcoal lighter fluid and several lighters. Bubrick refused to comply with police commands to lie across the bed with his hands outstretched. He yelled repeatedly that he was not going to jail and then charged toward one of the officers. The other officer shot Bubrick with a Taser gun. Bubrick tried to flee, but was caught by one of the officers. Bubrick screamed that he was not going to jail and struggled to free himself from the officer, despite the officer's orders for him to cease fighting. The other officer assisted in the physical struggle to gain control of Bubrick, and although Bubrick was pepper-sprayed and again shot by a Taser gun, he continued to struggle with the officers against their restraint. Bubrick disregarded the officers' commands to cease fighting and lie on the floor, and he continued to yell that he was not going to jail. The officers eventually subdued Bubrick to the extent that he could be handcuffed by a third uniformed law enforcement officer who had arrived as backup. Placed in a patrol car backseat, Bubrick continued to kick the vehicle's doors and windows, notwithstanding police commands to cease doing so.
During the scuffle with Bubrick, the officers discovered in Bubrick's jacket pocket a screwdriver and a container of charcoal lighter fluid. After the scuffle, a second container of charcoal lighter fluid was found on the bedroom floor where Bubrick initially had been discovered. On the night in question, Bubrick's ex-wife did not own any charcoal lighter fluid and did not store lighters in that part of the house.
1. Bubrick challenges his burglary conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to commit arson inside his ex-wife's residence.
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is set out in Jackson v. Virginia.(fn6) The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. An appellate court determines only the legal sufficiency of the evidence adduced below and does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.(fn7)
Bubrick misplaces reliance upon State v. Bryant.(fn8) In that case, the state contested the grant of the defendant's motion for directed verdict on a burglary charge.(fn9) We did not consider the merits of the state's evidentiary challenge, but dismissed the appeal, explaining, "The government cannot appeal such a directed verdict of acquittal, even if it is erroneously granted."(fn10) Here, no grant of a motion for directed verdict is being contested by the state. And the evidence showed that Bubrick broke into his ex-wife's residence at about 2:00 a.m., bringing with him containers of flammable liquid and several lighters. Although, as Bubrick points out, no fire was started, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bubrick intended to commit therein the felony of arson.(fn11)
2. Bubrick's contention that the state improperly injected his character in evidence was waived by his trial lawyer's failure to object.(fn12)
3. Bubrick contends that his trial lawyer's failure to object to improper character evidence amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Bubrick complains that two of the state's witnesses - a law enforcement officer and Bubrick's ex-wife - made references before the jury that he had been in jail.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must establish, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington,(fn13) that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. . . . In reviewing a trial court's determination regarding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court upholds the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous; we review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo.(fn14)
We need not address both components of the Strickland test if the showing on one is insufficient; nor must we address the components in any particular order.(fn15)
(a) While the first two officers who responded to the 2:00 a.m. emergency call testified that Bubrick adamantly proclaimed throughout their encounter that he was not going to jail, the third officer who later arrived as backup twice testified that he heard Bubrick scream, "I'm not going back to jail." "Evidence which is relevant to an issue in a case is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it incidentally puts the defendant's character at issue."(fn16) Here, the words Bubrick repeatedly screamed as he refused to comply with the officers' commands and resisted restraint by them demonstrated his intent to commit the counts of obstruction and hindering underlying this case. Evidence of Bubrick's utterances, therefore, was not rendered inadmissible merely because it incidentally put his character at issue,(fn17) and his trial lawyer's performance was not deficient for not objecting to this officer's recollection of what Bubrick said at the crime scene.(fn18)
(b) Bubrick's ex-wife was asked by the prosecutor about her and Bubrick's living arrangements after their divorce. She answered that she moved to her parents' home, while Bubrick remained at the apartment they had shared when married. She continued, "And when he was arrested, of course, he didn't have any place. When he got out he was [at a different residence]." On cross-examination, Bubrick's ex-wife was asked whether Bubrick had visited her residence after their divorce. She answered that, aside from those occasions in which Bubrick would just "show up" and she would call the police, he came to her residence every other weekend to pick up their child for scheduled visitation. She continued, "After he got out the judge say just visitations every Saturday [at] a public place, McDonald's or where she can play, and just for two hours." On re-direct, Bubrick's ex-wife was asked, "What does McDonald's have to do with the child and visitation?" She answered, ". . . he went to jail, so he got out and just [had] supervised visitations." Pretermitting whether trial counsel committed professional error by failing to object to the challenged testimony, having examined the entirety of the trial transcript, we find no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to object to the cited references, the outcome of Bubrick's trial would have been different.(fn19)
Judgment affirmed.
Barnes, C.J., and Johnson, P.J., concur.
Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer
GA Uncontested Divorce - Georgia Contested Divorce -
We specialize in: Georgia Separation Agreements - Spousal Support - Property Division - Alimony - Military Divorce - Contempt Actions in Divorce Cases, Uncontested Divorce, Savannah Georgia Noncontested divorce - Child Custody Attorney / Custody modification - Child Support Modification - Child Visitation
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WIEPERT et al
v.
STOVER et al.
A09A0197.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
July 2, 2009
BARNES, Judge.
David F. Wiepert and Carol E. Wiepert appeal the temporary order of the trial court awarding custody of D.T. to Marty Dwight Stover and Debra K. Stover. The Stovers are the child's maternal grandmother and step-grandfather, and the Wieperts are the child's great aunt and great step-uncle.
On May 20, 2008, the Stovers filed a petition for custody of D.T. in the Superior Court of Walker County. At that time, a petition for custody filed on April 17, 2007 by the Wieperts was pending in that same court, and a child deprivation petition was apparently pending in the Juvenile Court of Walker County.(fn1)
D.T. was in the custody of the Walker County Department of Family and Children Services ("DFACS"). The record is unclear as to why DFACS took custody of the child, but a hearing on the deprivation petition was scheduled for May 22, 2008. On May 21, apparently in response to a "motion to be divested of custody and dismiss case" filed by DFACS, the juvenile court entered an order continuing the deprivation hearing until June 10, 2008 and reserving a ruling on DFACS's motion pending the outcome of the superior court hearing. The juvenile court acknowledged that "the Superior Court has original jurisdiction in child custody matters and that sometimes cases arise where jurisdiction overlaps. . . . Because the Court is convinced that the Superior Court is quite capable of deciding this custody case correctly and it would be an ineffective use of Walker County funds and time to litigate the issue in two courts."
The trial court entered an ex parte order awarding immediate custody of D. T to the Stovers and set a hearing on the petition for June 3, 2008. The order directed that the Weiperts and other interested parties be served with a copy of the order, and at the hearing "show cause, if any, they have or can, why relief sought should not be granted." The Wieperts filed a motion to intervene arguing that the Stover's petition be denied because the custody issue was already before the court because of their 2007 custody petition, and the court's temporary order awarding them custody. They also argued that res judicata barred the Stover's claim relative to D.T.'s custody. The Wiepart's also filed an answer as intervenors in the case, asserting several defenses including collateral estoppel, estoppel by judgment, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join necessary parties, res judicata, abatement, and forum non-conviens. Following a hearing, which was not included with the record, the trial court entered a temporary order awarding full custody of D.T. to the Stovers. The order further noted that after hearing from the Weiperts, as intervenors, who were present with counsel, "and evidence having being presented to the Court, and the Court having heard the evidence, the Court hereby finds as a matter of fact and a matter of law that the Superior Court of Walker County has jurisdiction over the matter." The Weiperts appeal from that order.
1. The several enumerations of error the Weiperts contend that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action based on the principles of collateral estoppel, abatement, and res judicata, and forum non conveniens. We note however, that the record does not reflect that the Weiperts moved to dismiss the action based on any of these doctrines. The record reflects that the Weiperts filed a motion to intervene and an answer as intervenors. The record does not reflect that the trial court granted the motion to intervene, but presumably, it did so, as the custody order noted that the intervenors appeared at the hearing with counsel.
OCGA. § 9-11-12 contains the rules relating to answers, defenses, and how and when defenses are presented and heard. According to subsection (c) of this statute, "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." This Court has found no authority, and [the Weiperts] cite[] no authority, indicating the trial court has authority to treat an allegation or statement in an answer as a motion to dismiss the case.
Howell v. Styles, 221 Ga. App. 781, 782 (1) (472 SE2d 548) (1996).
Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-7 (b) (1), "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought."
To the extent that these arguments were presented at the hearing, the absence of a transcript prevents us from reviewing whether the issues were raised and properly rejected by the trial court. In the absence of a trial transcript, we must assume the correctness of the trial court's rulings. Hosseini v. Donino, 222 Ga. App. 697 (1) (475 SE2d 665) (1996).
2. The Weiperts also maintain that the trial court erred by failing to join necessary parties. "Where it is claimed that the plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party, the issue must be raised by motion to dismiss filed pursuant to OCGA. § 9-11-19. . . . Otherwise, such defenses are deemed waived. [Cit.]" Klorer-Willhardt, Inc. v. Martz, 166 Ga. App. 446, 447 (1) (304 SE2d 442) (1983). The record fails to reveal that this issue was properly presented to the trial court, and the absence of a transcript further precludes our reviewing this issue.
3. The Weiperts argue that the trail court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction at a time when the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction.
Under OCGA § 15-11-5 (c), `(w)here custody is the subject of controversy, except in those cases where the law gives the superior courts exclusive jurisdiction, in consideration of these cases the juvenile court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody and support when the issue is transferred by proper order of the superior court.' [Emphasis supplied.] There was no order of the superior court transferring the petition to the juvenile court here, and the jurisdiction obtained during the [original deprivation proceeding] could not serve to retain such jurisdiction. [A]fter a court has determined who is to be the legal custodian of a child, [a complaint by the legal custodian seeking a change of legal custody or visitation rights shall be brought as a separate action] in compliance with Article VI, Section XIV, Paragraph VI of the Constitution of this state.' [Emphasis supplied.] (Indention omitted.) OCGA § 19-9-23 (a) and (b)." Owen v. Owen, 183 Ga. App. 472, 473 (359 SE2d 229) (1987). Consequently, we find no merit to the [Weiperts] argument that the juvenile court retained jurisdiction . . . because [D.T.] had previously been adjudicated deprived. Although it is true that the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain petitions concerning children alleged to be deprived (see OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C)), the record here shows that the [Stovers] complaint for permanent custody was not in the nature of a deprivation petition and did not allege that they should be granted permanent custody of [D.T.] on the basis that the [child was] deprived.
Accordingly, as subject matter jurisdiction in this custody matter was properly in superior court, this enumeration is meritless.
Judgment affirmed.
Miller, C.J., and Andrews, P.J., concur.Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer
GA Uncontested Divorce - Georgia Contested Divorce -
We specialize in: Georgia Separation Agreements - Spousal Support - Property Division - Alimony - Military Divorce - Contempt Actions in Divorce Cases, Uncontested Divorce, Savannah Georgia Noncontested divorce - Child Custody Attorney / Custody modification - Child Support Modification - Child Visitation
Savannah GA, Richmond Hill, GA, Fort Stewart, Hinesville, Georgia Family Law Lawyer
v.
STOVER et al.
A09A0197.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
July 2, 2009
BARNES, Judge.
David F. Wiepert and Carol E. Wiepert appeal the temporary order of the trial court awarding custody of D.T. to Marty Dwight Stover and Debra K. Stover. The Stovers are the child's maternal grandmother and step-grandfather, and the Wieperts are the child's great aunt and great step-uncle.
On May 20, 2008, the Stovers filed a petition for custody of D.T. in the Superior Court of Walker County. At that time, a petition for custody filed on April 17, 2007 by the Wieperts was pending in that same court, and a child deprivation petition was apparently pending in the Juvenile Court of Walker County.(fn1)
D.T. was in the custody of the Walker County Department of Family and Children Services ("DFACS"). The record is unclear as to why DFACS took custody of the child, but a hearing on the deprivation petition was scheduled for May 22, 2008. On May 21, apparently in response to a "motion to be divested of custody and dismiss case" filed by DFACS, the juvenile court entered an order continuing the deprivation hearing until June 10, 2008 and reserving a ruling on DFACS's motion pending the outcome of the superior court hearing. The juvenile court acknowledged that "the Superior Court has original jurisdiction in child custody matters and that sometimes cases arise where jurisdiction overlaps. . . . Because the Court is convinced that the Superior Court is quite capable of deciding this custody case correctly and it would be an ineffective use of Walker County funds and time to litigate the issue in two courts."
The trial court entered an ex parte order awarding immediate custody of D. T to the Stovers and set a hearing on the petition for June 3, 2008. The order directed that the Weiperts and other interested parties be served with a copy of the order, and at the hearing "show cause, if any, they have or can, why relief sought should not be granted." The Wieperts filed a motion to intervene arguing that the Stover's petition be denied because the custody issue was already before the court because of their 2007 custody petition, and the court's temporary order awarding them custody. They also argued that res judicata barred the Stover's claim relative to D.T.'s custody. The Wiepart's also filed an answer as intervenors in the case, asserting several defenses including collateral estoppel, estoppel by judgment, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join necessary parties, res judicata, abatement, and forum non-conviens. Following a hearing, which was not included with the record, the trial court entered a temporary order awarding full custody of D.T. to the Stovers. The order further noted that after hearing from the Weiperts, as intervenors, who were present with counsel, "and evidence having being presented to the Court, and the Court having heard the evidence, the Court hereby finds as a matter of fact and a matter of law that the Superior Court of Walker County has jurisdiction over the matter." The Weiperts appeal from that order.
1. The several enumerations of error the Weiperts contend that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action based on the principles of collateral estoppel, abatement, and res judicata, and forum non conveniens. We note however, that the record does not reflect that the Weiperts moved to dismiss the action based on any of these doctrines. The record reflects that the Weiperts filed a motion to intervene and an answer as intervenors. The record does not reflect that the trial court granted the motion to intervene, but presumably, it did so, as the custody order noted that the intervenors appeared at the hearing with counsel.
OCGA. § 9-11-12 contains the rules relating to answers, defenses, and how and when defenses are presented and heard. According to subsection (c) of this statute, "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." This Court has found no authority, and [the Weiperts] cite[] no authority, indicating the trial court has authority to treat an allegation or statement in an answer as a motion to dismiss the case.
Howell v. Styles, 221 Ga. App. 781, 782 (1) (472 SE2d 548) (1996).
Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-7 (b) (1), "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought."
To the extent that these arguments were presented at the hearing, the absence of a transcript prevents us from reviewing whether the issues were raised and properly rejected by the trial court. In the absence of a trial transcript, we must assume the correctness of the trial court's rulings. Hosseini v. Donino, 222 Ga. App. 697 (1) (475 SE2d 665) (1996).
2. The Weiperts also maintain that the trial court erred by failing to join necessary parties. "Where it is claimed that the plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party, the issue must be raised by motion to dismiss filed pursuant to OCGA. § 9-11-19. . . . Otherwise, such defenses are deemed waived. [Cit.]" Klorer-Willhardt, Inc. v. Martz, 166 Ga. App. 446, 447 (1) (304 SE2d 442) (1983). The record fails to reveal that this issue was properly presented to the trial court, and the absence of a transcript further precludes our reviewing this issue.
3. The Weiperts argue that the trail court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction at a time when the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction.
Under OCGA § 15-11-5 (c), `(w)here custody is the subject of controversy, except in those cases where the law gives the superior courts exclusive jurisdiction, in consideration of these cases the juvenile court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody and support when the issue is transferred by proper order of the superior court.' [Emphasis supplied.] There was no order of the superior court transferring the petition to the juvenile court here, and the jurisdiction obtained during the [original deprivation proceeding] could not serve to retain such jurisdiction. [A]fter a court has determined who is to be the legal custodian of a child, [a complaint by the legal custodian seeking a change of legal custody or visitation rights shall be brought as a separate action] in compliance with Article VI, Section XIV, Paragraph VI of the Constitution of this state.' [Emphasis supplied.] (Indention omitted.) OCGA § 19-9-23 (a) and (b)." Owen v. Owen, 183 Ga. App. 472, 473 (359 SE2d 229) (1987). Consequently, we find no merit to the [Weiperts] argument that the juvenile court retained jurisdiction . . . because [D.T.] had previously been adjudicated deprived. Although it is true that the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain petitions concerning children alleged to be deprived (see OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C)), the record here shows that the [Stovers] complaint for permanent custody was not in the nature of a deprivation petition and did not allege that they should be granted permanent custody of [D.T.] on the basis that the [child was] deprived.
Accordingly, as subject matter jurisdiction in this custody matter was properly in superior court, this enumeration is meritless.
Judgment affirmed.
Miller, C.J., and Andrews, P.J., concur.Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer
GA Uncontested Divorce - Georgia Contested Divorce -
We specialize in: Georgia Separation Agreements - Spousal Support - Property Division - Alimony - Military Divorce - Contempt Actions in Divorce Cases, Uncontested Divorce, Savannah Georgia Noncontested divorce - Child Custody Attorney / Custody modification - Child Support Modification - Child Visitation
Savannah GA, Richmond Hill, GA, Fort Stewart, Hinesville, Georgia Family Law Lawyer
Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer - Savannah Georgia Child Custody Attorney
Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer - Savannah Georgia Child Custody Attorney
A definition for Child Custody and Support.
There are two kinds of custody: legal custody and physical custody. Custody battles most often arise in a divorce or separation, requiring a court's determination of which parent, relative or other adult should have physical and/or legal control and responsibility for a minor (child) under 18. When both parents share custody of a child after a divorce it is called joint custody. Joint custody may be either legal or physical custody. Physical custody designates where the child will actually live, whereas legal custody gives the custodial person(s) the right to make decisions for the child's welfare. Child custody can be decided by a local court in a divorce or if a child, relative, close friend or state agency questions whether one or both parents is unfit, absent, dead, in prison or dangerous to the child's well-being. In such cases custody can be awarded to a grandparent or other relative, a foster parent or an orphanage or other organization or institution. In some jurisdictions, if a child is old enough, their preferences are taken into consideration.
The basic consideration on custody matters is supposed to be the best interests of the child or children. Mental anguish suffered by the child due to visitation or lack thereof is one factor that may be considered in determining a child's best interest. In most cases the non-custodial parent is given visitation rights, which may include weekends, parts of vacations and other occasions. The custody order may be modifed if circumstances warrant. Such circumstances vary in each case, but may include loss of employment, disability, or extraordinary medical bills.
Courts may require the parents to consult with each other prior to any major decisions being made. Disagreements between the parties may be resolved by the parties going to mediation, returning to court, or by one parent having "final decision-making power". This decision-making authority may be broadly stated or limited, such as in emergencies, or be specifically related to certain areas of the child's life.
Child support is a court-ordered payment by one parent to the custodial parent of a minor child after divorce (dissolution) or separation. Usually the amount of support is based on the income of both parents, the number of children, the expenses of the custodial parent, and any special needs of the child. In many states or locales the amount is determined by a chart which factors in all these figures. It may also include health plan coverage, school tuition or other expenses, and may be reduced during periods of extended visitation such as summer vacations. Child care expenses (resulting from employment), medical, and educational expenses will usually be pro-rated in proportion to the parent's income. Generally, child support payments are for the ordinary expenses of food, shelter, clothing, education and medication needs for the children only. Child support generally continues until the child reaches 18 years, graduates from high school, is emancipated (no longer lives with either parent), or, in some cases, continues after the child reaches 18, such as duiring college attendance. Some states have child support guidelines for determining what expenses are included and in what amount.
The award of child support may be modified by the court upon petition of either party if a change of circumstance of the parents or child is proven. Child support is separate from alimony (spousal support) which is for the ex-spouse's support. Child support is not deductible from gross income for tax purposes nor is it taxed as income, unlike alimony, which is deductible by the payer and taxed as the adult recipient's income.
Child support and visitation are independent obligations. You can’t stop paying support if visitation is denied, and you can’t deny visitation for nonpayment of child support. A person who denies ordered visitation or fails to pay ordered child support can be held in contempt of court and states have various remedies, which vary by state, for pursuing claims against parents who owe back child support. Such remedies may include driver's license suspension, wage garnishment, and attaching unemployment compensation, worker's compensation, and federal tax refunds, among others. Local law should be consulted for specific requirements in your area.
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) Program is a Federal/State/local partnership to collect child support: we want to send the strongest possible message that parents cannot walk away from their children. Our goals are to ensure that children have the financial support of both their parents, to foster responsible behavior towards children, and to reduce welfare costs.
The CSE Program was established in 1975 as Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. It functions in all States and territories, through the State/county Social Services Department, Attorney General's Office or Department of Revenue. Most States work with prosecuting attorneys, other law enforcement agencies, and officials of family or domestic relations courts to carry out the program at the local level.
State Child Support Programs locate noncustodial parents, establish paternity, establish and enforce support orders, and collect child support payments. While programs vary from state to state, their services are available to all parents who need them.
If the Child Support Enforcement Program cannot locate the noncustodial parent with the information provided by the custodial parent, it must try to locate the noncustodial parent through the state parent locator service. The state uses various information sources such as telephone directories, motor vehicle registries, tax files, and employment and unemployment records. The state also can ask to locate the noncustodial parent. Data from the Social Security Administration, the IRS, the Selective Service System, the Department of Defense, the Veterans Administration, the National Personnel Records Center, and State Employment Security Agencies can then be collected.
Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer
GA Uncontested Divorce - Georgia Contested Divorce -
We specialize in: Georgia Separation Agreements - Spousal Support - Property Division - Alimony - Military Divorce - Contempt Actions in Divorce Cases, Uncontested Divorce, Savannah Georgia Noncontested divorce - Child Custody Attorney / Custody modification - Child Support Modification - Child Visitation
Savannah GA, Richmond Hill, GA, Fort Stewart, Hinesville, Georgia Family Law Lawyer
A definition for Child Custody and Support.
There are two kinds of custody: legal custody and physical custody. Custody battles most often arise in a divorce or separation, requiring a court's determination of which parent, relative or other adult should have physical and/or legal control and responsibility for a minor (child) under 18. When both parents share custody of a child after a divorce it is called joint custody. Joint custody may be either legal or physical custody. Physical custody designates where the child will actually live, whereas legal custody gives the custodial person(s) the right to make decisions for the child's welfare. Child custody can be decided by a local court in a divorce or if a child, relative, close friend or state agency questions whether one or both parents is unfit, absent, dead, in prison or dangerous to the child's well-being. In such cases custody can be awarded to a grandparent or other relative, a foster parent or an orphanage or other organization or institution. In some jurisdictions, if a child is old enough, their preferences are taken into consideration.
The basic consideration on custody matters is supposed to be the best interests of the child or children. Mental anguish suffered by the child due to visitation or lack thereof is one factor that may be considered in determining a child's best interest. In most cases the non-custodial parent is given visitation rights, which may include weekends, parts of vacations and other occasions. The custody order may be modifed if circumstances warrant. Such circumstances vary in each case, but may include loss of employment, disability, or extraordinary medical bills.
Courts may require the parents to consult with each other prior to any major decisions being made. Disagreements between the parties may be resolved by the parties going to mediation, returning to court, or by one parent having "final decision-making power". This decision-making authority may be broadly stated or limited, such as in emergencies, or be specifically related to certain areas of the child's life.
Child support is a court-ordered payment by one parent to the custodial parent of a minor child after divorce (dissolution) or separation. Usually the amount of support is based on the income of both parents, the number of children, the expenses of the custodial parent, and any special needs of the child. In many states or locales the amount is determined by a chart which factors in all these figures. It may also include health plan coverage, school tuition or other expenses, and may be reduced during periods of extended visitation such as summer vacations. Child care expenses (resulting from employment), medical, and educational expenses will usually be pro-rated in proportion to the parent's income. Generally, child support payments are for the ordinary expenses of food, shelter, clothing, education and medication needs for the children only. Child support generally continues until the child reaches 18 years, graduates from high school, is emancipated (no longer lives with either parent), or, in some cases, continues after the child reaches 18, such as duiring college attendance. Some states have child support guidelines for determining what expenses are included and in what amount.
The award of child support may be modified by the court upon petition of either party if a change of circumstance of the parents or child is proven. Child support is separate from alimony (spousal support) which is for the ex-spouse's support. Child support is not deductible from gross income for tax purposes nor is it taxed as income, unlike alimony, which is deductible by the payer and taxed as the adult recipient's income.
Child support and visitation are independent obligations. You can’t stop paying support if visitation is denied, and you can’t deny visitation for nonpayment of child support. A person who denies ordered visitation or fails to pay ordered child support can be held in contempt of court and states have various remedies, which vary by state, for pursuing claims against parents who owe back child support. Such remedies may include driver's license suspension, wage garnishment, and attaching unemployment compensation, worker's compensation, and federal tax refunds, among others. Local law should be consulted for specific requirements in your area.
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) Program is a Federal/State/local partnership to collect child support: we want to send the strongest possible message that parents cannot walk away from their children. Our goals are to ensure that children have the financial support of both their parents, to foster responsible behavior towards children, and to reduce welfare costs.
The CSE Program was established in 1975 as Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. It functions in all States and territories, through the State/county Social Services Department, Attorney General's Office or Department of Revenue. Most States work with prosecuting attorneys, other law enforcement agencies, and officials of family or domestic relations courts to carry out the program at the local level.
State Child Support Programs locate noncustodial parents, establish paternity, establish and enforce support orders, and collect child support payments. While programs vary from state to state, their services are available to all parents who need them.
If the Child Support Enforcement Program cannot locate the noncustodial parent with the information provided by the custodial parent, it must try to locate the noncustodial parent through the state parent locator service. The state uses various information sources such as telephone directories, motor vehicle registries, tax files, and employment and unemployment records. The state also can ask to locate the noncustodial parent. Data from the Social Security Administration, the IRS, the Selective Service System, the Department of Defense, the Veterans Administration, the National Personnel Records Center, and State Employment Security Agencies can then be collected.
Savannah GA Divorce Lawyer
GA Uncontested Divorce - Georgia Contested Divorce -
We specialize in: Georgia Separation Agreements - Spousal Support - Property Division - Alimony - Military Divorce - Contempt Actions in Divorce Cases, Uncontested Divorce, Savannah Georgia Noncontested divorce - Child Custody Attorney / Custody modification - Child Support Modification - Child Visitation
Savannah GA, Richmond Hill, GA, Fort Stewart, Hinesville, Georgia Family Law Lawyer
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